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I. 
INTRODUCTION 
In today’s  world  of paper  money,  money  consists 
of currency  created  by  the  printing  press  and  bank 
deposits  created  by  the  bookkeeping  operations  of 
bankers.  What  limits the  ability of the printing  presses 
and  the  pens  of bankers  to  create  money?  The  cur- 
rency  component  of  money  is central  bank  money 
(dollar bills). The  bank  deposits  component  of money 
is  backed  by  central  bank  money  (bookkeeping 
entries  at the  central  bank).  It  is the  central  bank’s 
monopoly  of  its  own  money  that  allows  it  to  limit 
creation  of the  public’s  money.  In turn,  limitation  of 
central  bank  money  and  the  public’s  money  limits 
the  price  level.  The  essence  of central  banking  lies 
in the  responsibility  to limit the  money  stock  in order 
to  tie  down  the  price  level. 
In practice,  central  banks  typically  do  not  decide 
explicitly  how much  of their  money  to create.  Instead, 
they  create  and  extinguish  their  money  in response 
to the  current  behavior  of financial  markets.  The  par- 
ticular  nature  of this  process  of central  bank  money 
creation  determines  how  the  money  stock  and  the 
price  level  are  actually  limited.  The  nature  of  this 
process  depends  in  turn  upon  the  macroeconomic 
goals  of  the  central  bank.  How  then  does  the  way 
the  central  bank  selects  macroeconomic  goals  and 
weights  their  relative  importance  determine  the 
behavior  of  the  price  level? 
In order  to answer  these  questions,  it is necessary 
to  have  a  model  that  captures  the  connection  be- 
tween  the  goals  of  the  central  bank  and  nominal 
(dollar)  variables:  the  monetary  base  (central  bank 
money),  the  money  stock  and  the  price  level.  The 
purpose  of this article  is to lay out  such  a model.  The 
model  is general  in that  it applies  to any central  bank 
that  operates  in a regime  of paper  money,  although 
occasional  specific  references  are made  to the  Federal 
Reserve  System. 
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Section  II  presents  an  intuitive  discussion  of 
the  model.  The  actual  model  is  presented  in  the 
Appendix.1  Section  III elucidates  the  working  of the 
model  by showing  how  the  central  bank  smooths  in- 
terest  rate  fluctuations.  Section  IV uses  the  model 
to  discuss  money  stock  and  price  level  determina- 
tion.  This  section  states  the  two major  responsibilities 
of the  modern  central  bank.  First,  the  central  bank 
gives the price  level  an equilibrium  value.  Specifically, 
the  central  bank  gives  the  price  level  a well-defined 
or  particular  value  such  that  market  forces  operate 
to eliminate  departures  of the  actual  price  level  from 
this value.  Second,  the  central  bank  determines  how 
the  equilibrium  value  of the  price  level  changes  over 
time.  The  article  concludes  with suggestions  for clari- 
fying  the  responsibility  of  the  central  bank  for  the 
behavior  of  the  price  level. 
Il. 
THE MODEL 
The  Structure  of the  Economy  and 
the  Interest  Rate 
The  model  gives  substance  to  the  natural  rate 
hypothesis.  This  hypothesis  summarizes  the  inherent 
limitations  on  the  central  bank’s  ability  to  influence 
real variables.  These  limitations  derive  from  the  fact 
that  paper  money  creation,  or  monetary  base  crea- 
tion,  does  not  alter  the  real resources  available  to the 
economy.  The  public  cares  only  about  real variables, 
while  the  central  bank  only  determines  the  behavior 
of  a  nominal  variable,  the  monetary  base. 
In  the  literature  that  follows  the  work  of  Lucas 
(1972),  the  natural  rate  hypothesis  is given  content 
by allowing only  changes  in money  and the  price  level 
not  expected  by  the  public  to  affect  real  variables. 
Furthermore,  the  public  is assumed  to  form  its ex- 
pectations  “rationally,”  that  is, in a way  that  is con- 
sistent  with  assumptions  made  about  the  structure 
1 This  model  has  been  worked  on  especially  by  economists 
associated  with  the  Federal  Reserve  Bank  of  Richmond.  [See 
Dotsey  and King (1983),  McCallum  (1981  and  1986), and Good- 
friend  (1987)]. 
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The  natural  rate  hypothesis  then  implies  that  the  cen- 
tral bank  cannot  systematically  affect  the  level  of real 
variables.  For  example,  the  central  bank  cannot 
systematically  lower  the  level  of  the  real  (inflation- 
adjusted)  rate  of interest  [Sargent  (1973)].  Through 
the  policy  process  it  chooses  for  determining  the 
monetary  base,  however,  it  can  influence  the  way 
random  macroeconomic  disturbances  affect  fluctua- 
tions  in  real  variables. 
Equation  (1)  summarizes  the  determinants  of the 
market  rate  (rt).2 
This  equation  is  derived  from  two  more  funda- 
mental  relationships.  One,  the  IS  function,  sum- 
marizes  the  conditions  under  which  the  goods  market 
clears.  For  different  values  of  real  output,  it  shows 
the  values  of the  expected  real  rate  of  interest  that 
cause  investment  and  saving  to be  equal.  The  other 
function  makes  the  supply  of real output  depend  upon 
the  contemporaneous  price  level  error  (Pt  -  Et - 1Pt). 
The  IS  function  and  the  aggregate  supply  function 
are  equated,  and  output  is  eliminated  from  the 
resulting  expression.  (The  goods  market  must  clear 
at  a level  compatible  with  the  aggregate  supply  of 
output.)  The  resulting  partially  reduced  form,  when 
solved  for  the  market  rate,  is  equation  (1). 
The  first  right-hand  term  of (1) equals  the  rate  of 
inflation  the  public  expects.  In the  second  right-hand 
term,  the  function  Frr is the  expected  real rate  of in- 
terest.  The  real rate  depends  upon  a constant  (c) and 
the  contemporaneous  price  level  error  (Pt  -  Et - 1Pt). 
This  functional  form  derives  from  the  particular  form 
of the  natural  rate  hypothesis,  which  makes  fluctua- 
tions  in output  respond  to discrepancies  between  the 
contemporaneous  price  level  and  the  public’s  prior 
expectation  of  the  contemporaneous  price  level. 
When  the  price  level  is higher  than  the  public  had 
expected  in the  prior  period,  that  is, when  Pt exceeds 
Et - 1Pt, real  output  and  saving  rise,  and  the  real rate 
of interest  falls,  and  conversely.  (These  real  effects 
of  inaccurate  forecasts  of  the  price  level  can  be 
thought  of  as  deriving  from  the  existence  of  one- 
period  contracts  fixed  in dollar  terms.)  Finally,  the 
expected  real  rate  is affected  by  real  sector  disturb- 
ances  (Qt). 
2  E  indicates  an  expectation  formed  by  the  public  and  the 
subscript  t  indicates  the  time  period  when  the  public  formed 
that  expectation.  The  subscript  t is the  contemporaneous  time 
period,  while  t -  1 and  t + 1 are  the  prior  period  and  the  follow- 
ing  period,  respectively. 
The  Demand  and  Supply  of Money 
Equation  (2)  is a  money  demand  function. 
Nominal  money  demand  equals  the  product  of 
the  price  level  (Pt),  real  money  demand  (given  by 
the  function  Fmd),  and  a random  disturbance  term 
(Vt).  Real  money  demand  varies  inversely  with  the 
market  rate  of  interest  (rt)  and  positively  with  real 
output.  The  function  Fmd,  instead  of  showing  real 
output  as a variable,  shows  the  variable  (Pt  -  Et - 1Pt) 
because  real output  varies  positively  with this variable, 
the  contemporaneous  price  level  error. 
The  money  supply  function  has  the  form  of  a 
money-multiplier  formula. 
The  money  supply  equals  the  product  of  the 
monetary  base  (Bt) and the  multiplier,  which  is given 
by  the  function  Fmm. This  function  depends  upon 
the  market  rate  (rt). There  is a positive  relationship 
between  the  market  rate  and  the  multiplier  because 
of the  effect  of the  market  rate on the  reservesdeposit 
ratio  desired  by banks  and  the  currency-deposit  ratio 
desired  by  the  nonbank  public.  The  multiplier  is also 
affected  by  a  random  term  (Xt). 
The  Monetary  Policy  Process 
The  monetary  policy  process  is summarized  by the 
procedure  the  central  bank  puts  into place for creating 
and  extinguishing  the  monetary  base  (Bt).  This 
procedure  is  shown  in  equation  (4). 
The  three ø  parameters  of  (4)  determine  the  time- 
series  behavior  of  the  monetary  base.3  They  sum- 
marize  the  information  the  public  needs  about 
monetary  policy  to form  an expectation  of the  future 
price  level. 
3  Equation  (4) summarizes  the  policy  process  through  the  time- 
series  behavior  of  the  monetary  base,  as  determined  by  the ø 
parameters.  Equation  (4) could,  alternatively,  be  solved  in a way 
that  makes  the  market  rate  (rt) the  left-hand  variable.  With  this 
formulation,  the  policy  process  would  be  summarized  by  the 
time-series  behavior  of the  market  rate.  The  model  is unaffected 
by  the  choice  of  whether  to  summarize  the  policy  process  in 
terms  of the  behavior  of the  base  or the  market  rate.  Although 
monetary  policy  can  be  summarized  by  the  behavior  of  the 
interest  rate,  the  effect  of  monetary  policy  on  the  economy  is 
transmitted  solely  through  the  process  that  generates  the 
monetary  base  [Goodfriend  and  King  (1988)]. 
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of growth  of the  monetary  base.  With  the  simplify- 
ing assumption  that  real  output  does  not  grow  over 
time,  this  rate  of growth  is also  the  trend  rate  of in- 
flation.  The  second  parameter,  øsmooth, is the  rate 
smoothing  parameter.  øsmooth specifies  the  change 
in  the  monetary  base  the  central  bank  makes  in 
response  to  deviations  in  the  market  rate  from  a 
reference  rate  Et - 1rt. It follows  from  the  natural  rate 
hypothesis  that  the  central  bank  must  set  this 
reference  rate  equal  to the  model’s  expected  real rate 
plus  the  trend  rate  of  inflation  (c  +  øtrend). 
Each  period,  random  disturbances  impact  the 
economy  and  move  the  market  rate  away  from  the 
reference  rate.  When  the  market  rate  exceeds  the 
reference  rate,  the  central  bank  increases  the 
monetary  base  by  an amount  that  depends  upon  the 
value  of øsmooth, and  conversely.  The  result  is that 
each  period  there  is a change  in the  monetary  base 
that  could  not  have  been  predicted  in the  previous 
period.  The  base  drift parameter,  ødrift, specifies  how 
much  of the  prior  period’s  unpredictable  change  in 
the  monetary  base  the  central  bank  offsets  in  the 
subsequent  period.  There  are  two  general  cases.  In 
the  case  of  either  no  offset  or  only  a partial  offset 
(ødrift not  equal  to  one),  the  level  of  the  monetary 
base  will  be  affected  permanently  each  period  by 
some  random  amount.  Because  there  is then  no path 
to which  the  base  tends  to return,  the  monetary  base 
follows  a random  walk  (superimposed  on the  persis- 
tent  movement  given  by the  value  of the  growth  rate 
parameter  øtrend). In  the  case  of  a  complete offset, 
the  base  fluctuates  over  time  around  a well-defined 
path.  These  two  cases  are  also  said  to  produce, 
respectively,  nonstationary  and  stationary  behavior 
of  the  monetary  base. 
Central  Bank  Objectives 
Assume  now  that  the  central  bank  possesses  two 
macroeconomic  objectives:  an economic  stabilization 
objective  and  a  monetary  stabilization  objective. 
These  objectives  can  be  expressed  by the  loss func- 
tion  (5). 
The  first  right-hand  term  in  (5)  measures  the  vari- 
ability  of  contemporaneous  price  level  errors.  The 
central  bank  considers  the  fluctuations  in  output 
caused  by these  errors  to be undesirable.  It therefore 
attempts  to  limit  the  variability  of these  errors.  The 
second  right-hand  term  measures  the  variability  in 
the  rate  of inflation  the  public  expects.  The  central 
bank  also attempts  to minimize  this  variability.  The 
coefficients  on  the  two  right-hand  terms  reflect  the 
relative  importance  of the  economic  stabilization  and 
inflation  stability  objectives.  The  central  bank 
chooses  the  values  of the ø  parameters  in (4) in order 
to  minimize  the  value  of  C  in  (5).4 
The  Complete  Model 
The  equations  of  the  model  are  listed  below. 
With  the  constraints  imposed  by  rational  expecta- 
tions  and the  assumption  that  money  demand  equals 
money  supply,  equations  (1)-(4)  can  be  solved  for 
rt,  Pt,  Mt,  Bt,  Et - 1Pt  and  EtPt +1.  The  resulting 
values  for  [Pt  -  Et-  1Pt] and  (EtPt+1/Pt  -  1] are 
substituted  into  the  central  bank’s  loss  function  (5). 
The  loss  function  is now  expressed  in terms  of the 
structural  parameters  of the  model,  the  disturbances, 
and  the  ø parameters.  Finally,  the  central  bank  sets 
the ø  values  in order  to minimize  this  expression  for 
the  loss  function. 
4 The  model  is  intended  for  policy  analysis.  Policy  analysis 
involves  the  conceptual  exercise  of assuming  different  objective 
functions  for  the  central  bank  as  a way  of  discussing  how  the 
central  bank  affects  the  behavior  of  the  economy.  In  contrast 
to  this  kind  of  analysis,  the  model  could  be  used  to  forecast, 
say,  inflation.  In  this  case,  it  would  be  necessary  to  use  the 
actual  objective  function  of the  central  bank  and  to  be  explicit 
about  the  way  this  function  changes  over  time.  This  kind  of 
exercise  is more  difficult  because  of the  need  to understand  how 
in  the  real  world  the  policy  process  affects  the  way  the  public 
forms  its  expectations.  In  a  world  in  which  monetary  policy 
evolves  in unexpected  ways,  it will be  inherently  difficult to model 
realistically  the  way  in which  the  expectations  formation  of the 
public  is  shaped  by  the  policy  process.  In  order  to  form 
expectations,  the  public  must  evaluate  how  the  central  bank’s 
objective  function  will change  and  how  such  changes  will  alter 
the  time  series  behavior  of  the  monetary  base. 
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The  nature  of the  model  imposes  a discipline  on 
policy  analysis.  The  model  is dynamic,  that  is,  it is 
concerned  with how  the  monetary  aggregates  and the 
price  level  change  over  time.  Furthermore,  the 
public’s  expectations  of  the  future  values  of  these 
variables  are  shaped  by  the process the  central  bank 
uses to generate  changes  in the  monetary  base.  (That 
is,  the  public’s  expectations  depend  upon  the ø 
parameters  the  central  bank  chooses  to  govern 
monetary  base  creation.)  It follows  that  one  can  use 
the  model  to ask what happens  when  the  central  bank 
takes  a  particular  policy action  only  if  the  policy 
process  that  generated  the  particular  action  is  also 
specified.  That  is,  one  must  know  the  ø values  of 
(4).  For  example,  the  model  cannot  be  used  to 
predict  the  effect  on  the  money  stock  and  the  price 
level  of  a  change  in  the  monetary  base  of  a  given 
amount,  if that  change  is all that  is specified.  The 
reason  is that  the  effect  of a particular  policy  action 
depends  upon  the  public’s  expectation  of subsequent 
policy  actions,  and  this  expectation  depends  upon 
the  nature  of  the  policy  process.5 
III. 
RATE SMOOTHING 
Insight  into  the  way  the  model  works  can  be 
gained by using  it to understand  how  the  central  bank 
smooths  interest  rates.  The  central  bank  can  smooth 
fluctuations  in the  market  rate  in two  ways.  Assume 
that  the  policy  process  that  governs  the  behavior  of 
the  monetary  base  makes øsmooth  positive.  Assume 
also that  ødrift is greater  than  zero.  (There  is at least 
some  subsequent  offset  of random  variations  in the 
monetary  base.)  Consider  an unanticipated,  positive 
real  sector  disturbance  (Qt),  for  example,  a 
technological  innovation  that  increases  investment. 
This  disturbance  increases  the  market  rate  and  the 
central  bank  responds  by  increasing  the  monetary 
base.  The  money  stock  and the  price  level  rise.  The 
price  level  will now  exceed  the  value  the  public  had 
predicted  last  period,  so  real  output  rises.  Because 
5  In  the  model,  for  example,  the  effect  of  a  change  in  the 
monetary  base  can  only  be  predicted  with  an  understanding  of 
how  the  market  rate  is affected.  The  public,  however,  in order 
to  set  the  market  rate,  must  form  an  expectation  of  the  future 
price  level.  (It  needs  this  expectation  to  estimate  the  inflation 
premium  to  put  into  the  market  rate.)  In  order  to  form  an 
expectation  of the  future  price  level,  it must  know  the  value  of 
the  base  drift  parameter.  The  reason  is  that  the  base  drift 
parameter  determines  the  extent  to  which  the  change  in  the 
monetary  base  will be  incorporated  permanently  into  the  future 
level  of  prices. 
of  the  rational  expectations  assumption,  both  the 
error  in predicting  the  price  level  and the  associated 
rise  in output  will be  transitory.  Because  the  rise  in 
output  is transitory,  the  public  saves  a relatively  high 
proportion  of it. This  increased  saving offsets  to some 
extent  the  initial  rise  in the  real  rate  of interest  and 
in  the  market  rate. 
The  market  rate is also smoothed  as a consequence 
of  the  interaction  between  the  rate  smoothing  and 
base  drift parameters.  As noted  above,  with  a positive 
øsmooth  parameter,  the  positive  real sector  disturbance 
increases  the  money  stock  and raises  the  price  level. 
Because  the  central  bank  is  assumed  not  to  allow 
complete  base  drift,  the  public  will expect  that  the 
central  bank  will offset  next  period  at least  some  of 
the  current  period’s  increase  in money.  The  public 
will then  expect  that,  after  adjusting  for trend  growth, 
the  money  stock  and  the  price  level  will  be  higher 
in  the  present  period  than  in the  next  period.  The 
expected  future  one-period  inflation  rate  will  fall 
below  trend.  A fall in the  premium  in the  market  rate 
for  expected  inflation  will  mitigate  the  rise  in  the 
market  rate  caused  by  the  real  disturbance. 
IV. 
MONEY STOCK  AND PRICE LEVEL 
DETERMINATION 
Graphical  Analysis  and  Determinacy 
of  the  Price  Level 
The  determination  of  the  money  stock  and  the 
price  level  is  shown  graphically  in  Figure  1.  The 
inverse  of  the  price  level  (the  goods  price  of 
money)  is shown  on  the  vertical  axis.  The  nominal 
amounts  of money  demanded  and supplied  are shown 
on  the  horizontal  axis.  The  nominal  money  demand 
and  supply  schedules  are  derived  by  substituting 
(1) into  (2) and (3), respectively.  The  money  demand 
(supply)  schedule  then  expresses  the  relationship 
between  the  price  level  and  nominal  money  demand 
(supply)  given  a partially-reduced  form  that  assumes 
fixed  values  for price  level  expectations  (Et - 1Pt and 
EtPt+1)  and  the  monetary  base,  but  allows  the 
interest  rate  and  output  to  vary. 
Before  discussing  these  schedules,  it  is useful  to 
note  that,  given  the  public’s  prior  expectation  of the 
contemporaneous  price  level  (Et - 1Pt), a  rise in the 
contemporaneous  price  level  (Pt) produces  a positive 
price  level  forecast  error,  that  is,  [Pt  -  Et-  1Pt] 
becomes  positive.  As  a result,  there  is a transitory 
increase  in output.  Also,  under  the  assumption  that 
both  Et - 1Pt and  EtPt+1  are fixed,  a rise  in the  price 
level  lowers  the  market rate  of interest  in two ways. 
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scribed  increases  saving,  which  lowers  the  real  rate 
of  interest.  Second,  an  increase  in  the  price  level 
reduces  the  expected  one-period  rate  of inflation,  that 
is,  (EtPt+1  -  Pt)  declines.  The  market  rate  then 
declines  from  a reduction  in the  inflation  premium. 
With  this  discussion  in  mind,  now  consider  the 
ways  in which  money  demand  is increased  by  a rise 
in  the  price  level  (a fall in  the  inverse  of  the  price 
level).  First,  a rise in the  price  level  produces  a direct 
proportional  increase  in  the  demand  for  money. 
Second,  money  demand  is increased  by the  increase 
in output  produced  by  a positive  price  level  predic- 
tion  error.  Third,  the  fall  in  the  market  rate  of  in- 
terest  produced  by  the  price  rise  increases  money 
demand. 
Consider  next  the  effect  of a price  rise on nominal 
money  supply.  A rise  in  the  price  level  causes  the 
market  rate  to  decline  for  the  reasons  mentioned 
above.  This  decline  in the  market  rate  decreases  the 
money  supply  by  lowering  the  value  of  the  money 
multiplier  function,  Fmm, for  a  given  value  of  the 
monetary  base. 
The  money  stock  and  the  price  level  are endoge- 
nously  determined  through  the  intersection  of  the 
money  demand  and  supply  schedules.  These  vari- 
ables possess  well-defined  equilibrium  values  because 
of the  existence  of these  schedules.  If the  price  level 
falls below  its equilibrium  level,  the  nominal  amount 
of  money  supplied  exceeds  the  nominal  amount  of 
money  demanded,  and  the  price  level  returns  to  its 
equilibrium  value,  and  conversely.  The  nominal 
money  demand  and  supply  schedules  exist  because 
the  central  banks  policy  process  (4)  permits  the 
public  to form  an expectation  of the  future  price  level 
(EtPt+1). 
This  policy  process  specifies  the ø  parameters  upon 
which  EtPt+1  depends.6  These  parameters  derive 
from  the  objectives  of the central  bank  as summarized 
in (5).  One  can,  therefore,  ask  the  question,  “How 
are nominal  variables  made  well defined?”  by  asking 
“What  characteristics  must  the  central  bank’s  objec- 
tive  (loss)  function  possess  in  order  to  permit  the 
public  to  form  an  expectation  of  the  future  price 
level?”  With  the  loss  function  (5)  the  central  bank 
cares  about  the  contemporaneous  price  level  (through 
the  first right-hand  term)  and the  change  in the  price 
level  (through  the  second  right-hand  term).  This  loss 
function,  therefore,  constrains  the  behavior  of 
nominal  variables  sufficiently  for the  public  to be  able 
to  form  an  expectation  of the  future  price  level.  In 
short,  it  is  the  central  bank  that  gives  nominal 
variables  (the  price  level  and  money  stock) 
equilibrium  values. 
Figure  1 
NOMINAL  MONEY  DEMAND 
AND  SUPPLY  SCHEDULES 
The  Effect  of Macroeconomic  Disturbances 
on  the  Money  Stock 
Consider  first  the  way  in which  an  unexpected, 
positive  real  sector  disturbance  (Qt)  influences  the 
money  stock  and the  price  level  with  rate  smoothing 
(øsmooth greater  than  zero)  and  base  drift  (ødrift less 
than  one).  As the  market  rate  begins  to rise,  the  cen- 
tral  bank  supplies  reserves  and  the  money  supply 
schedule  shifts  rightward.  In  Figure  1, MS shifts  to 
(MS)'.  Two  opposing  forces  shift  the  position  of the 
nominal  money  demand  schedule.  On  the  one  hand, 
an increase  in the  market  rate  shifts  it leftward.  On 
the  other,  the  unexpected  increase  in the  monetary 
base  and the  money  stock  requires  a higher price  level 
than  the  public  had  expected,  so  real  output  rises. 
The  increase  in  output  shifts  the  money  demand 
schedule  rightward.  In  Figure  1,  the  net  result  is 
assumed  to yield  a rightward  shift from  Md to (Md)'. 
6 The  solution  for  EtPt+1  yielded  by  (1) -  (4)  includes  values 
of the ø  parameters  in  all its  terms.  These  terms  are  a) a con- 
stant;  b)  the  value  of  the  monetary  base  in  the  prior  period 
multiplied  by  the  two-period  growth  rate  (1  +  øtrend)2; c)  a 
negative  term,  ødrift, multiplied  by the  prior  period’s  unexpected 
change  in  the  monetary  base;  d)  a  term,  øsmooth(1  -  ødrift 
multiplied  by  a  linear  combination  of  the  monetary  and  real 
disturbances: 
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dominates  the  rightward  shift  in the  money  demand 
schedule,  and  the  price  level  rises.7,8 
Consider  next  the  effect  of a positive  money  de- 
mand  disturbance  (Vt) with  significant  rate  smoothing 
(øsmooth large)  and  significant  base  drift (ødrift  near 
zero).  Because  the  model  is dynamic  and  accounts 
for  the  way  the  policy  process  affects  the  expecta- 
tions  of the  public,  it yields  strikingly  different  results 
than  the  standard  static models  of money  stock  deter- 
mination.  The  following  example  illustrates  that, 
when  there  is base  drift,  rate  smoothing  does  not  in- 
sulate  the  price  level  and  the  real  sector  from  money 
demand  shocks.  The  positive  disturbance  to  money 
demand  causes  an  incipient  increase  in the  market 
rate.  For  a large  value  of  øsmooth, the  central  bank 
increases  the  monetary  base  by enough  to make  the 
money  supply  schedule  shift  rightward  in line  with 
the  money  demand  schedule.  In Figure  2,  (Md) and 
(Ms)  shift  rightward  by  the  same  amount  to  (Md)' 
and  (MS)',  with  no  effect  on  the  price  level.  In  the 
absence  of  base  drift,  there  are  no  further  effects. 
The  price  level  and  real  variables  are  unaffected. 
If the  central  bank  allows  base  drift,  however,  the 
money  demand  disturbance  will increase  permanently 
the  level  of the  monetary  base  and  the  money  stock. 
Because  the  model  assumes  that  the  increase  in 
money  demand  due  to  the  monetary  disturbance  is 
transitory,  the  public  will expect  a higher  price  level 
next  period.  The  expected  one-period  inflation  rate 
will rise,  and  the  market  rate  will start  to rise  further 
7 These  shifts  in the  money  demand  and  supply  schedules  are 
the  primary  shifts  due  to  a  øsmooth greater  than  zero.  There  are 
secondary  shifts  (not  shown  in Figure  1) due  to  the  interaction 
between  øsmooth and  ødrift. The  real  sector  disturbance  produces 
a  higher  money  stock  in  the  contemporaneous  period.  The 
increase  in the  price  level  required  by  the  higher  money  stock, 
however,  is mitigated  by  the  rise  in the  demand  for real  money 
produced  by  the  higher  level  of output.  The  rise  in real  output 
is transitory.  The  existence  of base  drift  in the  monetary  aggre- 
gates  implies  that,  in  contrast,  at  least  some  of the  increase  in 
the  money  stock  is  permanent.  Consequently,  the  public  will 
expect  (adjusting  for  trend  growth)  a price  level  in  the  future 
that  is higher  than  the  contemporaneous  price  level.  The  infla- 
tion  premium  in  the  market  rate  will  rise.  The  consequent 
rise  in  the  market  rate  will  cause  the  central  bank  to  increase 
further  the  monetary  base.  The  shifts  in  the  money  demand 
and  supply  schedules  shown  in  Figure  1 are  then  amplified. 
The  initial  change  in the  money  stock  is proportional  to øsmooth. 
The  additional  change  is  proportional  to  the  product 
øsmooth  (1  -  ødrift). With  no base  drift ødrift  equal  to  one),  there 
are  no  secondary  effects. 
8 As  noted  above,  the  rise  in  the  price  level,  relative  to  both 
the  prior’ period’s  expectation  of  the  price  level  and  the  con- 
temporaneous  expectation  of  next  period’s  price  level,  affects 
the  public’s  savings  behavior  and  inflationary  expectations  in a 
way  that  mitigates  the  rise  in  the  market  rate. 
Figure  2 
NOMINAL  MONEY  DEMAND 
AND  SUPPLY  SCHEDULES 
Note:  The  dashed  lines show  the  effect  of  a  positive  disturbance 
to  money  demand.  The  dashed  lines marked  by  a  double 
prime  show  that  part  of the  effect  due  to  base  drift. 
due  to  an  increase  in  the  inflation  premium.  In 
response,  the  central  bank  will  then  increase  the 
monetary  base  again, and the  money  supply  schedule 
will  shift  rightward  again.  In  Figure  2,  (MS)'  shifts 
rightward  to  (MS)“. As in the  case  of the  real  sector 
disturbance,  the  price  level  rises  and  real  output  is 
stimulated.  It then  follows  that  (Md)’ shifts to (Md)“.9 
Rate  smoothing  does  not  insulate  the  real sector  from 
monetary  disturbances.10 
9 The  increase  in  output  increases  saving.  Increased  saving 
lowers  the  real  rate  and  offsets  the  increase  in  the  market  rate 
caused  by  the  increase  in  the  inflation  premium.  The  rise  in 
the  market  rate  caused  by  the  money  demand  disturbance  is, 
therefore,  mitigated.  These  secondary  effects  from  the  money 
demand  disturbance  are  analogous  to  those  described  in  foot- 
note  7. 
10 The  model  is constructed  with  nominal  money  demand  and 
supply  schedules  that  derive  from  different  behavioral  relations. 
The  money  demand  schedule  comes  from  (2),  the  real  money 
demand  function.  The  money supply  schedule  comes  from  (3). 
the  money-multiplier  function.  The  determinants  of real money 
demand  and  nominal  money  supply  are  different.  The  model, 
therefore,  makes  the  quantity-theory  assumption  that 
macroeconomic  disturbances  will  produce  divergent  shifts  in the 
nominal  money  demand  and  supply  schedules.  In  the  jargon  of 
econometrics,  the  model  assumes  that  the  money  demand  and 
supply  schedules  are  identified.  Independent  shifts  in  these 
schedules  occur  that  permit  the  econometrician  to  use  actual 
observations  on the  money  stock  and  the  price  level  to  identify 
separate  demand  and  supply  schedules. 
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of  the  Price  Level 
Although  with  rate  smoothing  the  monetary  base 
is determined  endogenously,  the  procedure  the  cen- 
tral  bank  puts  into  place  for  altering  the  monetary 
base  determines  how  the  monetary  base,  the  money 
stock,  and  the  price  level  are  affected  by  macro- 
economic  disturbances.  Furthermore,  while particular 
random  realizations  of  the  monetary  base  are  pro- 
duced  by  macroeconomic  disturbances,  the 
timeseries  behavior  of the  monetary  base  is largely 
determined  by  the  central  bank.  The ø  parameters, 
which  are  set  by  the  central  bank,  determine  the 
general  behavior  over  time  of the  monetary  base  and 
also the  time  series  behavior  of the  money  stock  and 
the  price  level. 
The  rate  smoothing  parameter  (øsmooth)  determines 
the  variability  of the  monetary  aggregates  and  price 
level.  A  higher  value  of  øsmooth requires  increased 
variability  in the  monetary  aggregates  and,  after some 
point,  increased  variability  in  the  price  level.  The 
trend  growth  rate  parameter  (øtrend) determines  the 
trend  growth  rate  of the  monetary  aggregates  and the 
price  level.  With  a positive  value  of øtrend, the  money 
supply  schedule  (MS) shifts rightward  over  time  down 
the  money  demand  schedule  (Md) at the  rate  given 
by  øtrend. The  price  level  rises  at  the  rate  given  by 
øtrend.  Sustained  inflation  is always  and  everywhere 
a  monetary  phenomenon  [Friedman  (1968)]. 
The  base  drift  parameter  ødrift determines  how  a 
change  in the  money  stock  shifts  the  initial  position 
of  the  money  supply  schedule  in  the  subsequent 
period.  With  a value  of ødrift different  from  one,  tran- 
sitory  macroeconomic  disturbances  shift permanently 
the  position  of the  money  supply  schedule.  In  this 
way,  transitory  disturbances  are incorporated  perma- 
nently  into  the  price  level.  An  implication  of  the 
model  is that  a random  walk  in prices  is always  and 
everywhere  a monetary  phenomenon.  The  model  is 
special  in that  it does  not  allow for a permanent  com- 
ponent  to  real  sector  and  money  demand  distur- 
bances.  If these  disturbances  possessed  a significant 
permanent  component,  base  drift  in the  price  level 
could  still occur  even  in the  absence  of base  drift  in 
the  monetary  aggregates.  There  would,  however,  still 
be truth  to the  statement  that  a random  walk in prices 
is a monetary  phenomenon.  The  central  bank  can 
have  any  time  series  behavior  of  the  price  level  it 
desires.  For  example,  nonstationary  behavior  in the 
price  level  could  never  arise  if the  central  bank  had 
price  stability  as  one  of  its  objectives.  Such  an 
objective  would  introduce  into  the  central  bank’s 
objective  function  a term  like  k(Pt -  P),  where  k  is 
a constant  and  P  is the  central  bank’s  stable  price 
level  objective. 
V. 
POLICY CHOICES FACED BY 
THE CENTRAL BANK 
The  model  makes  possible  a comparison  of alter- 
native  policies  by  elucidating  the  trade-offs  made  in 
selecting  one  policy  rather  than  another.  First,  the 
model  identifies  those  policies  that  do  not  require 
the  policymaker  to make  trade&s  among  objectives. 
When  it is necessary  to  make  trade-offs,  the  model 
clarifies  their  nature.  The  policymaker  can  ask,  “In 
order  to gain the  benefits  from  adoption  of a particular 
policy,  what  benefits  must  be  foregone  by  rejection 
of  alternative  policies? 
When  Must  the  Policymaker  Trade  Off? 
The  standard  discussion  of  trade-offs  in  policy- 
making  is by  Tinbergen  (1967).  Tinbergen  points 
out  that  the  policymaker  with  multiple  objectives 
need  not  make  compromises  when  seeking  to attain 
these  objectives  if he  possesses  as many  policy  in- 
struments  as  he  has  objectives.  Attainment  of  the 
objectives  of policy  is then  constrained  only  by  the 
structure  of  the  economy.  If the  number  of  objec- 
tives  exceeds  the  number  of policy  instruments,  the 
policymaker  must  make  a choice  about  the  relative 
importance  of  each  objective.  An  increase  in  the 
significance  attached  to  one  objective  necessarily 
decreases  the  significance  that  can be attached  to the 
other  objectives.  This  section  reformulates 
Tinbergen’s  discussion  in terms  of the dynamic  model 
used  here. 
In  order  to  discuss  policy  choices,  it is necessary 
to posit  an objective  function.  An objective  function 
makes  explicit  the  central  bank’s  objectives  and  the 
relative  importance  it assigns  to  achievement  of its 
different  objectives.  In (5),  the  objective  function  is 
expressed  as a loss function  that  the  central  bank  at- 
tempts  to  minimize  through  the  choice  of  the ø 
parameters  in (4).  The  parameters  ß  and  y  express 
the  relative  importance  the  central  bank  assigns  to 
achievement  of  the  two  objectives  of  economic 
stabilization  and  inflation  stabilization. 
The  central  bank  has  available  two  degrees  of 
freedom  (øsmooth and  ødrift) to  use  in  pursuit  of  its 
objectives.  It  can  vary  these  parameters  in order  to 
influence  the  way  macroeconomic  disturbances 
affect  the  relationship  between  the  contemporaneous 
price  level  and  the  prior  period’s  expectation  of this 
variable.  Also,  it can  vary  these  parameters  in order 
to  influence  the  way  macroeconomic  disturbances 
affect  the  relationship  between  the  contemporaneous 
price  level  and  the  contemporaneous  expectations 
of next  period’s  price  level.  These  variations  in the 
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next  period’s  price  level.  These  variations  in  the 
policy  process  can  only  be effected  through  changes 
in øsmooth  and  ødrift. Under  the  assumption  that  the 
public’s  expectations  are formed  rationally,  the  cen- 
tral bank’s choice  of the  trend  growth-rate  parameter 
(øtrend) cannot  affect  the  first relationship  and  affects 
the  second  relationship  only  by the  addition  of a con- 
stant.  The  choice  of  a value  for  øtrend greater  than 
zero  does  not  help  the  central  bank  attain  any  of its 
macroeconomic  objectives.11 
With  the  loss  function  (5),  the  central  bank 
possesses  two  objectives  and possesses  two  degrees 
of  freedom  for  manipulating  the  behavior  of  the 
monetary  base.  The  central  bank  is  not  forced  to 
trade  off  between  achievement  of  its  objectives.  It 
can  minimize  the  variability  of  inaccurate  forecasts 
of  the  price  level  without  reducing  its  ability  to 
minimize  the  variability  of expected  inflation,  and vice 
versa.  Its pursuit  of each  objective  is constrained  only 
by  the  inherent  uncertainty  caused  by  random 
macroeconomic  disturbances.  Formally,  this  result 
shows  up in the  central  bank’s  choices  of øsmooth  and 
ødrift that  minimize  (5).  The  optimal  values  of  the 
øs  do  not  depend  upon  the  relative  magnitudes  of 
ß  and  y.  Even  if the  central  bank  were  to  weight 
heavily  one  objective,  it would  not  have  to  sacrifice 
achievement  of  its  other  objective. 
The  Optimal  Choice  of øsmooth 
The  optimal  value  of the  rate  smoothing  parameter 
increases  as the  variability  of money  demand  distur- 
bances  (the  variability  of the  Vt) rises  relative  to  the 
variability  of  the  real  sector  disturbances  (the  vari- 
ability  of the  Qt).  Increases  in the  value  of the  rate- 
smoothing  parameter  up to its optimal  value  reduce 
variability  in the  price  level  and  reduce  undesirable 
fluctuations  in  output.  Further  increases  raise  the 
variability  of the  price  level  and  increase  fluctuations 
in output.  This  result  can be understood  by consider- 
ing the  allocative  role  played  by  the  interest  rate  in 
the  price  system. 
The  real rate  of interest  is a price  (the  price  of cur- 
rent  output  in terms  of  future  output)  whose  varia- 
11 A  loss  function  like  (5)  that  contains  only  macroeconomic 
objectives  cannot  rationalize  a positive  rate  of  inflation.  Barro 
and  Gordon  (1983)  attempt  to explain  the  existence  of positive 
inflation  in  a model  like  the  one  here  in  that  the  central  bank 
understands  the  structure  of  the  economy.  Their  explanation 
turns  on  the  discretionary  character  of  policy  (the  inability  of 
the  central  bank  to  precommit  itself  to  a particular  objective 
function)  and  a desire  by  the  central  bank  to  lower  persistently 
the  value  of  a real  variable  like  unemployment.  Hetzel (1988) 
explains  inflation  as  a  way  of  generating  revenue  through  an 
inflation  tax. 
tions  distribute  aggregate  demand  across  time.  The 
interest  rate varies  in order  to cause  the  goods  market 
to clear  at a level  of output  compatible  with  aggregate 
supply.  A change  in the  interest  rate  due  to  a distur- 
bance  in  money  demand,  however,  offers  a  mis- 
leading  signal  for  intertemporal  resource  allocation. 
The  greater  the  importance  of disturbances  from  the 
monetary  sector  relative  to disturbances  from  the  real 
sector,  the  more  frequently  changes  in interest  rates 
will be  misleading  guides  to  resource  allocation  and 
the  higher  the  optimal  value  of  the  rate-smoothing 
parameter.  If monetary  disturbances  are large relative 
to real disturbances,  it is desirable  for the  central  bank 
to  supply  the  monetary  base  in a way  that  smooths 
fluctuations  in  the  market  rate. 
The  Optimal  Choice  of ødrift 
One  striking  result  derived  from  minimizing  (5) 
is that  it is optimal  for  the  central  bank  to  eliminate 
completely  base  drift.  This  result  can  be understood 
intuitively.  The  optimal  value  of the  rate  smoothing 
parameter  puts  an  amount  of  interest  rate  sensi- 
tivity  into  the  monetary  base  that  reflects  the 
likelihood  that  an  interest  rate  fluctuation  is due  to 
a money  demand  disturbance.  Because  such  disturb- 
ances  are assumed  to be transitory,  there  is no reason 
to allow fluctuations  in the  monetary  aggregates  due 
to  fluctuations  in  the  market  rate  to  affect  perma- 
nently  the  money  stock.12  Base  drift  would  increase 
the  variability  of expected  inflation,  the  second  right- 
hand  term  in (5),  without  reducing  the  variability  of 
inaccurate  forecasts  of the  price  level,  the  first  right- 
hand  term  in  (5). 
Trade-offs  in  the  Choice  of  Policies 
The  loss function  (5) cannot  explain  the  actual time 
series  behavior  of the  monetary  aggregates  and  the 
price  level.  An obvious  problem  with  (5),  given  the 
result  noted  in the preceding  paragraph,  is that  it can- 
not  explain  the  significant  amount  of  base  drift 
12 If there  is a permanent  component  to  either  money  demand 
disturbances  or real  output  disturbances  and  if the  central  bank 
desires  to render  the  price  level  stationary,  it needs  to allow some 
amount  of base  drift  in the  monetary  base  and  the  money  stock 
[Walsh  (1986)).  Whether  shocks  to  the  money  demand  func- 
tion  exercise  a transitory  or a permanent  effect  upon  the  demand 
for  money  is  an  empirical  issue.  (In  fact,  it  appears  to  depend 
upon  the  monetary  aggregate  considered.  M1  velocity  appears 
to be  a random  walk.  but  M2  velocity  is stationary.  There  may 
be  a permanent  element  to disturbandes  in real output,  although 
the  time  series  behavior  of output  is  disputed  by  economists.) 
In any event,  the  nonstationarity  in the  price  level  that  appeared 
after  countries  abandoned  the  gold  standard  for  a paper  money 
standard  can  only  be  explained  by  the  nonstationarity  intro- 
duced  into  the  monetary  base  at  this  time. 
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A loss  function  [from  Goodfriend  (1987)]  that  can 
explain  base  drift  is  shown  in  (6). 
With  (6),  the  central  bank  attempts  to minimize  the 
variability  of  three  variables:  the  market  rate  of 
interest,  inaccurate  price  level  forcasts,  and expected 
inflation.  Minimization  of  this  loss  function  can 
generate  the  kind  of  base  drift  that  has  character- 
ized  nominal  variables  in the  post-World  War  II era. 
Now,  while  the  central  bank  possesses  three  ob- 
jectives,  it still has  only  two  degrees  of freedom  for 
varying  its policy  process;  consequently,  it must  trade 
off among  achievement  of its objectives.  Minimiza- 
tion  of  (6)  implies  that  in general  the  central  bank 
will  allow  base  drift.  It  will  also  set  a  higher  value 
for the  rate  smoothing  parameter  than  is optimal  for 
minimizing  fluctuations  in real  output.  The  central 
bank  trades  off  achievement  of  reduced  variability 
in price  level  forecast  errors  and  expected  inflation 
in  order  to  obtain  a  reduction  in  variability  in  the 
market  rate.  With  (6),  in contrast  to (5),  the  optimal 
values  of  the ø  parameters  depend  upon  the  ratios 
of  the  trade-off  parameters: 
VI. 
CLARIFYING THE MONETARY RESPONSIBILITIES 
OF THE CENTRAL BANK 
The  Role  of  Money  in  the  Formulation 
of Monetary  Policy 
There  is an  ongoing  debate  over  the  importance 
to  assign  to  the  behavior  of  money  in the  formula- 
tion  of monetary  policy.  With  the  financial  deregula- 
tion  of the  early  1980s  and  the  resulting  uncertainty 
over  the  behavior  of the  public’s  M1  demand  func- 
tion,  this  debate  has centered  on the  contention  that 
the  role  of  money  should  be  reduced  when  money 
demand  is highly  variable.13  For  example,  Stephen 
13 The  nationwide  introduction  of NOW  accounts  in  1981 and 
their  incorporation  into  M1  altered  the  character  of the  public’s 
demand  for M1.  Because  NOWs  pay  explicit  interest,  they  have 
caused  M1  to  become  more  highly  substitutible  with  deposits 
used  for  saving,  rather  than  for  transactions.  Because  that  part 
of  M2  that  is  not  included  in  M1  contains  primarily  savings- 
related  deposits,  M1  including  NOWs  has  become  more  highly 
substitutible  with  the  non-M1  component  of M2.  The  result  has 
been  to alter  the  character  of the  public’s  M1  demand  function. 
[The  character  of  the  M2  demand  function  has  remained  un- 
Axilrod  (Staff  Director  of  the  Office  for  Monetary 
and  Financial  Policy  at the  Board  of Governors  until 
July  1986)  uses  the  increased  uncertainty  over  the 
behavior  of  money  demand  to  explain  the  de- 
emphasis  of money  in the  policy  process  after  1982: 
.  .  .  money  became  less  useful  as  a  policy  instrument 
because  of  a  combination  of  market  developments  and 
attitudinal  shifts  that  made  it  more  unstable  in  relation 
to  the  economy  and  its  own  history.  So  money  was  de- 
emphasized  after  1982  for  pragmatic  economic  reasons. 
[Axilrod  (1988)  p.  59] 
[See  also  Axilrod  (1985),  p.  17.) 
The  most  important  aspect  of monetary  policy  is 
the  central  bank’s  objective  function.  The  objective 
function  determines  the  policy  process  (4)  through 
the  values  set  for  the ø  parameters.  This  policy 
process  can  be  formulated  with  the  monetary  base 
as the  left-hand  variable  or  the  interest  rate  as the 
left-hand  variable.  In the  former  formulation  (the  one 
employed  here),  it  is  natural  to  discuss  monetary 
policy  in  terms  of  the  behavior  of  the  monetary 
aggregates.  In the  latter  formulation,  it is natural  to 
discuss  monetary  policy  in terms  of the  behavior  of 
the  interest  rate.  In actual practice,  central  banks  have 
not  usually  formulated  policy  discussions  in terms  of 
the  behavior  of  the  monetary  aggregates.  Instead, 
they  have  discussed  monetary  policy  in terms  of the 
behavior  of the  discount  rate  and its effect  on money 
market  rates.14 
There  is, however,  a reason  to  discuss  monetary 
policy  in terms  of the  behavior  of the  monetary  ag- 
gregates.  The  time  series  behavior  of the  aggregates 
translates  into  the  time  series  behavior  of the  price 
level  more  directly  than  is the  case  with  the  interest 
rate.  A given  increase  in the  trend  rate  of growth  of 
the  monetary  aggregates  (øtrend) implies  the  same  in- 
crease  for  the  trend  rate  of inflation.  An increase  in 
rate  smoothing  (øsmooth)  beyond  an optimal  value  im- 
plies  an increase  in the  variability  of the  price  level. 
Base  drift  in the  monetary  aggregates  (ødrift different 
from  one)  implies  base  drift  in the  price  level  (apart 
changed  (Hetzel  and  Mehra,  1988).]  As  a result,  a debate  has 
occurred  over  the  usefulness  of M1  in the  policy  process.  Also, 
M1  has  often  been  accepted  as the  definition  of money.  Conse- 
quently,  the  debate  has  often  taken  the  form  of whether  money 
can play a role in the  formulation  of monetary  policy when  money 
demand  is highly  variable.  [Angell  (1987)  and  Johnson  (1988), 
for example,  have  sought  replacements,  at least  temporarily,  for 
money  in  policy  discussions.  Their  work  concentrates  on  the 
role  of  money  as  an  indicator  variable.] 
14 In  the  United  States,  the  Federal  Reserve  System  has 
modified  the  traditional  discount  rate  procedure  by  choosing  a 
combination  of  the  discount  rate  and  borrowed  reserves.  The 
market  rate  is then  determined  as the  sum  of the  discount  rate 
and  some  positive  amount  that  is  proportional  to  the  level  of 
borrowed  reserves. 
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permanent  component  in disturbances  to money  de- 
mand  and output).  This  connection  between  the  time 
series  behavior  of the  monetary  aggregates  and  the 
price  level  holds  regardless  of the  degree  of variability 
in  money  demand. 
The  importance  of  clarifying  the  implications  of 
monetary  policy  for  the  behavior  of  the  price  level 
is increased  due  to  the  indirect  way  the  behavior  of 
the  price  level  is produced  in actual  practice.  Typi- 
cally,  the  central  bank  possesses  multiple  macro- 
economic  objectives.15  It  has,  however,  only  the 
two  degrees  of freedom  for pursuing  these  objectives 
given  by the  two  parameters  (øsmooth  and ødrift)  that 
alter  the  time  series  behavior  of the  monetary  base. 
The  behavior  of  the  price  level  (and  the  monetary 
aggregates)  emerges  as a by-product  of the  trade-offs 
the  central  bank  must  make  in order  to pursue  multi- 
ple objectives  with  a more  limited  number  of degrees 
of freedom  to  manipulate  in setting  the  policy  pro- 
cess.  Furthermore,  the  central  bank’s objective  func- 
tion  is not  made  explicit  in policy  discussions.  The 
trade-offs  that  must  be  made  in pursuit  of  multiple 
objectives  are  not  discussed  explicitly.  The  link 
between  these  trade-offs  and  the  price  level  is 
obscured  when  the  central  bank’s  objective  function 
is not  made  explicit  in policy  discussions  and  when 
policy  is  discussed  in  terms  of  interest  rates  (or  a 
money  market  proxy).  In contrast,  the  implications 
for  the  price  level  of  these  trade-offs  are  clearer 
when  policy  is discussed  in terms  of  the  monetary 
aggregates. 
Explicit  Targets  for  the  Money  Stock 
Determination  of the  monetary  base  in part  on the 
basis  of  current  conditions  in  the  money  market 
obscures  the  responsibility  of  the  central  bank  for 
the  behavior  of the  monetary  base,  the  money  stock, 
and  the  price  level.  The  consequent  endogeneity  of 
15  The Federal Reserve Act stipulates  that  the  Federal  Open 
Market  Committee  should  set  its  ranges  for  the  monetary 
aggregates  “taking  account  of past  and  prospective  developments 
in  employment,  unemployment,  production,  investment,  real 
income,  productivity,  international  trade  and  payments,  and 
prices”  [Board  of  Governors  (1984)]. 
the  monetary  base  facilitates  special  factors  explana- 
tions  of  inflation,  that  is,  explanations  that  confine 
the  causes  of inflation  to the  macroeconomic  disturb- 
ances  that  impinge  upon  the  economy.16  Endoge- 
nous  determination  of  the  monetary  base  also 
obscures  the  way  the  central  bank  gives  the  money 
stock  and  the  price  level  well-defined  equilibrium 
values.  In  the  absence  of  explicit  limitation  of  the 
monetary  base,  the  money  stock  and  the  price  level 
are made  well-defined  economic  variables  by the  way 
the  central  bank  determines  the  public’s  expectation 
of the  future  price  level.  This  indirectness  obscures 
central  bank  responsibility. 
In  order  to  clarify  the  way  it  determines  the 
behavior  of prices,  the  central  bank  could  formulate 
the  policy  process  in terms  of  the  monetary  aggre- 
gates.  The central  bank  could  select  a single  defini- 
tion  of the  money  stock  as a substantive  intermediate 
target  and  explain  to the  public  the  relationship  that 
it believes  will hold  over  time  between  the  money 
stock  and  an explicitly  formulated  path  for the  price 
level.17 The  central  bank  could  also use the  monetary 
base  as the  policy  variable  it sets  in order  to  achieve 
its  intermediate  money  target.  [See  Black  (1986).] 
Conclusion 
Clarification  of the  monetary  responsibilities  of the 
central  bank  requires  an  explicit  statement  of  the 
objectives  of  the  central  bank  and  the  relative  im- 
portance  attached  to these  objectives.  It also requires 
an explicit  statement  of how  the  central  bank  believes 
its  monetary  policy  will achieve  its  objectives.  It  is 
necessary  to  make  explicit  the  consequences  of 
monetary  policy  for  the  behavior  of the  price  level. 
Hopefully,  the  model  presented  in  this  article  will 
aid in discussion  of the  monetary  responsibilities  of 
the  central  bank. 
16 See  Cullison  (1988)  for a discussion  of the  possible  influence 
on  monetary  policy  of  special  factors  explanations  of  inflation 
in  the  1970s. 
17 In order  to  make  the  money  stock  a substantive  intermediate 
target,  it would  be  necessary  to  make  the  decision  whether  co 
allow  base  drift  in  its  targeted  value  an  explicit  part  of  the 
decision-making  process. 
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Equation  (1)  is an IS function.  It shows  the  com- 
binations  of real  output  and  the  real  rate  of interest 
that  equate  the  public’s  desired  saving  and 
investment. 
Real  output  is yt;  the  interest  rate  rt;  and  the  price 
level  pt.  (All the  variables  are logarithms,  except  for 
rt.)  The  subscript  t  indicates  the  time  period.  E  is 
the  expectations  operator  with  the  subscript  in- 
dicating  the  time  period  at which  the  expectation  was 
formed.  The  variable  wt  is  a  serially-uncorrelated, 
zero-mean  random  shock.  Equation  (2)  is  an  ag- 
gregate  supply  function. 
The  public’s  supply  of goods  varies  positively  with 
its  error  in  predicting  the  contemporaneous  price 
level.  It  is assumed  that  this  monetary  nonneutral- 
ity  arises  from  one-period  contracts  specified  in 
nominal  terms. 
Next,  equate  the  IS function  (1) and the  aggregate 
supply  function  (2)  in order  to  eliminate  output  yt; 
solve  the  resulting  expression  for rt; and  simplify  the 
notation  for  the  coefficients  and  error  term  (qt  is a 
transformation  of  wt  and  remains  a  serially- 
uncorrelated,  zero-mean  random  error). 
The  market  for  the  quantity  of  money  is  de- 
scribed  by  a money  demand  function  and  a money 
supply  function.  The  money  demand  function  is 
Nominal  money  demand  depends  positively 
upon  the  price  level  (pt)  and  real  output  (yt)  and 
negatively  upon  the  market  rate  of interest  (rt). The 
variable  vt  is  a  serially-uncorrelated,  zero-mean 
random  shock. 
The  money  supply  function  is 
Bt is the  (log  of  the)  monetary  base.  The  term  b1 
is a constant  that  captures  the  effect  on  the  money- 
multiplier  of the  legal required  reserve  ratio. The  term 
b2rt captures  the  effect  on  the  multiplier  of  the  in- 
terest  sensitivity  of  excess-reserves  and  currency- 
deposit  ratios.  The  variable  xt  is  a  serially- 
uncorrelated,  zero-mean  shock  to the  value  of these 
ratios. 
Equation  (6) describes  the  behavior  of the  central 
bank. 
The  central  bank  specifies  three  parameters  (the 
three  øs) that  determine  the  time  series  behavior  of 
the  monetary  base.  The  parameter  ø3 is  the  trend 
rate  of growth  of the  base.  The  parameter  ø1 deter- 
mines  the  interest  elasticity  of  the  monetary  base. 
It  specifies  the  extent  to  which  the  central  bank 
smooths  movements  of  the  market  interest  rate 
around  a reference  level  Et-1rt.  The  central  bank 
cannot  smooth  the  market  rate  around  an  arbitrary 
level.  It  is constrained  to  smooth  around  the  prior 
period’s  expectation  of the  market  rate.  This  expec- 
tation  is the  sum  of the  expected  real rate  and  of the 
trend  rate  of  inflation.  (The  solution  of  the  model 
is determinate  only  for  this  value.)  Specifically,  the 
central  bank  must  smooth  the  market  rate  around 
the  value  (c1  +  ø3), which  is Et-  1rt from  (3).  The 
variable  [rt  -  (c1  +  ø3)] measures  innovations  (un- 
predictable  changes)  in the  market  rate.  Interest-rate 
innovations  cause  the  central  bank  to produce  innova- 
tions  in the  monetary  base,  which,  from  (6),  equal 
ø1 times  the  interest  rate  innovations. 
The  third  term  on  the  right  side  of  (6)  measures 
the  extent  to  which  the  central  bank  offsets,  in the 
contemporaneous  period,  last period’s  innovation  in 
the  monetary  base.  There  are  two  general  cases.  In 
one  case,  ø2 differs  from  one,  so that  there  is not  an 
exact  offset  to last period’s  innovation.  The  monetary 
base  then  behaves  like  a random  walk  with  a per- 
sistence  over  time  given  by  ø3. In  the  second  case, 
ø2 is one  so that  the  central  bank  offsets  exactly  last 
period’s  innovation.  In  this  case,  Et-2Bt-1  can  be 
defined  as ø0  +  ø3(t -  1), where  t is the  number  of 
time  periods  that  have  elapsed  since  a base  period 
0. The  constant  ø0 is the  (log of the)  monetary  base 
at  time  0.  This  expression  defines  a  path  for  the 
monetary  base  that  grows  over  time  at  the  rate  ø3 
and  around  which  the  monetary  base  fluctuates. 
The  model’s  equations  are listed  below.  [Equation 
(7)  comes  from  substituting  from  the  aggregate 
supply  function  (2)  into  (4),  the  money  demand 
function,  and  simplifying  the  notation  for  the 
coefficients.] 
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Goodfriend  (1987)]  for  the  central  bank.  Var  is 
variance. 
With  the  assumption  that  money  demand  equals 
money  supply  and  the  assumption  of rational  expec- 
tations,  equations  (7)-(10)  can  be  solved  for  mt,  pt, 
rt,  and  Bt.  The  solutions  for  the  contemporaneous 
price  level  prediction  error  Ipt  -  Et - 1pt] and  for 
expected  inflation  [Etpt+1  -  pt]  are  substituted 
into  (11).  With  these  substitutions,  the  central  bank’s 
cost  function  is  expressed  in  terms  of  the ø 
parameters  that  characterize  the  behavior  of  the 
monetary  base.  The  central  bank  chooses  these 
parameters  in  order  to  minimize  (11). 
The ø  parameters  that  minimize  (11)  are 
Poole  (1970,  p.  208)  for  a solution  for  ø1 in a static 
model.]  The  model  does  not  determine  a value  for 
ø3. Note  that  the  values  of ø1 and  ø2 that  minimize 
(11) also minimize  each  term  of (11) separately.  Con- 
sequently,  the  ß and  y parameters  do  not  enter  into 
the  expression  for  the  øS. The  central  bank  is not 
forced  to  trade  off  among  conflicting  objectives. 
Consider  now  the  cost  function  (14). 
The ø  values  that  minimize  this  cost  function  involve 
the  process  for  generating  the  monetary  base  in  a 
way  that  reflects  the  relative  importance  it  assigns 
to achieving  conflicting  objectives.  With  (14),  the  op- 
timal  rate  smoothing  parameter  ø1 is larger  than  the 
ø1 in (12).  The  base  drift  parameter  ø2 is in general 
different  from  one.  Its  value  is greater  or  less  than 
one  depending  upon  the  parameters  of the  cost  func- 
tion  (14)  and the  structural  parameters  of the  model. 
For  example,  ø2 is less  than  one  if  and  y  are large 
and  the  magnitude  of  c2 is large. 
(The  structural  parameters  of  the  model,  a2, a3, 
b2,  and c2,  are  functions  of  the ø  parameters.  Dif- 
ferent  objective  functions  imply  different  structural 
coefficients  [Lucas  (1976)].)  For  some  issues,  it  is 
important  to  model  how  the  policy  process  affects 
the  structural  relationships  that  summarize  the 
economy.  For  example,  the  model  incorporates  a 
money  demand  function  and  a money  supply  func- 
tion.  Sargent  (1981a)  and Goodfriend  (1983)  discuss, 
respectively,  the  way  in  which  a  change  in  the 
monetary  policy  process  affects  the  structural  form 
of the  money  demand  function  and the  money  supply 
function.  The  major  policy  issue  of interest  here  is 
the  way different  objective  functions  affect  the  general 
time  series  behavior  of  the  price  level.  For  this 
issue,  the  main  assumption  that  must  be made  is that 
the  signs  of  the  structural  parameters  remain  un- 
changed  when  the  policy  process  that  generates  the 
monetary  base  changes. 
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